


# **Consensus Mechanism Design based on Structured DAGs**

Jiheng Zhang

HKUST

# Blockchain




## WHAT IS GREAT

- ✓ Secure: Nakamoto consensus
- ✓ Decentralized: PoW


## WHAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

- ❑ TPS
- ❑ Latency: waiting + confirmation
- ❑ Concentration of mining power
- ❑ Transactions with little fees


# Parallelism




# Parallelism



# Parallelism



# Parallelism



Structured DAGs

**Structured DAGs**

# Block Structure


Block Size in bytes	
<code>id<sub>prev</sub></code>	32
<code>id<sub>ms</sub></code>	32
<code>id<sub>tip</sub></code>	32
<code>nonce</code>	4
<code>peer</code>	65
<code>message</code>	~ 500



# Block Structure


Peer chain

Previous block by  
the same peer




Block Size in bytes	
<code>id<sub>prev</sub></code>	32
<code>id<sub>ms</sub></code>	32
<code>id<sub>tip</sub></code>	32
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
# Block Structure



# Block Structure



# Block Structure



# Proof of Work

$$B = (id_{prev}, id_{ms}, id_{tip}, nonce, message)$$

$$H(B) = \underbrace{0\dots\dots 0}_{\text{leading } x \text{ bits are all } 0} * * * * *$$

Regular Block

regular block reward + Tx fee

$$H(B) = \underbrace{0\dots\dots\dots\dots 0}_{\text{leading } y \text{ bits are all } 0} * * * *$$

Milestone Block

additional bonus\*

# Proof of Work

$$B = (id_{prev}, id_{ms}, id_{tip}, nonce, message)$$

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
$$H(B) = \underbrace{0\dots\dots\dots\dots 0}_{\text{leading } y \text{ bits are all } 0} * * * *$$

Milestone Block


additional bonus\*

Three pointers have to be specified before knowing the type!

# Structured DAG




# Structured DAG







# Structured DAG




# Structured DAG




# Structured DAG




# Structured DAG




# Structured DAG



# Structured DAG




# Structured DAG



$$\mathcal{S}(B_m, B'_m) = \mathcal{C}(B_m) \setminus \mathcal{C}(B'_m)$$


# Structured DAG




Peers obtain different parts of the big block from different peers continuously over time.





# Transaction Assignment




# Transaction Assignment



# Transaction Assignment




# Transaction Assignment



$$.H(\text{miner's state, Tx}) < c \times \underbrace{\text{miner's hashing power}}_{q_i}$$

# Transaction Assignment




$$.H(\text{miner's state, Tx}) < c \times \underbrace{\text{miner's hashing power}}_{q_i}$$

verifiable

$q_i$

consensus

# Transaction Assignment



$$. H(\text{miner's state}, T_x) < c \times \underbrace{\text{miner's hashing power}}_{q_i}$$

verifiable

$q_i$

consensus

# Protocol

## RECEIVING A BLOCK

Suppose Alice has a local DAG

$$\mathcal{G}_a = \mathcal{C}(B_m)$$

1. Download if height is too small
2. Solidify + topological sort
3. Add blocks one by one


# Protocol

## RECEIVING A BLOCK

Suppose Alice has a local DAG


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





# Bob's local DAG




Bob's local DAG




Alice's local DAG



Bob's local DAG



Alice's local DAG



# Protocol

## CREATING A BLOCK

Block Size in bytes	
	32
	32
	32
	4
	~ 500

# Protocol

## CREATING A BLOCK

1. Find a transaction Alice can process

Block Size in bytes	
	32
	32
	32
	4
message	~ 500

# Protocol

## CREATING A BLOCK

1. Find a transaction Alice can process
2. Prepare **three pointers**

Block Size in bytes	
$id_{prev}$	32
$id_{ms}$	32
$id_{tip}$	32
	4
message	~ 500

# Protocol

## CREATING A BLOCK

1. Find a transaction Alice can process
2. Prepare **three pointers**
3. Solve the cryptographic puzzle

Block Size in bytes	
<code>id<sub>prev</sub></code>	32
<code>id<sub>ms</sub></code>	32
<code>id<sub>tip</sub></code>	32
<code>nonce</code>	4
<code>message</code>	~ 500

# Protocol

## CREATING A BLOCK

1. Find a transaction Alice can process
2. Prepare **three pointers**
3. Solve the cryptographic puzzle
4. Broadcast the block

Block Size in bytes	
$id_{prev}$	32
$id_{ms}$	32
$id_{tip}$	32
nonce	4
message	~ 500

syntactically valid



# Protocol

## CREATING A BLOCK

1. Find a transaction Alice can process
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syntactically valid


Peer chain forked

Consensus failed


Connectivity broken

- What if not pointing to the miner's previous block
- What if not pointing to the most recent milestone
- What if not pointing to a recent regular block by others

# Building a Ledger



# Building a Ledger



Post-order DFS



✓ chronological order of blocks on a peer chain

✓ approximate chronological order of all blocks

# Building a Ledger

Order all transactions  
in a level set




$Tx_1, Tx_2, Tx_3, \dots$



# Building a Ledger

Order all transactions  
in a level set


$\text{Tx}_1, \text{Tx}_2, \text{Tx}_3, \dots$



# Reward Scheme


Block Size in bytes	
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<del><code>peer</code></del>	<del>65</del>
<code>message</code>	~ 500

# Reward Scheme



Block Size in bytes	
$id_{prev}$	32
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<del>peer</del>	<del>65</del>
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
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# Reward Scheme



Block Size in bytes	
$id_{prev}$	32
$id_{ms}$	32
$id_{tip}$	32
nonce	4
<del>peer</del>	<del>65</del>
message	~ 500

✓ No peer id/sig to save message space

✓ No coinbase to reduce the number of UTXOs

# Reward Scheme

Type	Status	Transaction	Reward	Bonus
regular +	on peer chain	Valid	$r + \text{Tx fee}$	0
regular +	on peer chain	Invalid	$r$	0
regular +	forked	Valid	0	0
regular +	forked	Invalid	0	0
milestone	longest MS chain	Valid	$r + \text{Tx fee}$	$\% \times r \times \text{level set}$
milestone	longest MS chain	Invalid	$r$	$\% \times r \times \text{level set}$

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not to fork peer chain

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try luck on another block

not to fork peer chain

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try luck on another block

not to fork peer chain

try best to make your milestone on the longest chain

# Reward Scheme

Type	Status	Transaction	Reward	Bonus	
regular +	on peer chain	Valid	$r + \text{Tx fee}$	0	} <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> try luck on another block
regular +	on peer chain	Invalid	$r$	0	
regular +	forked	Valid	0	0	} <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> not to fork peer chain
regular +	forked	Invalid	0	0	
milestone	longest MS chain	Valid	$r + \text{Tx fee}$	$\% \times r \times \text{level set}$	} <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> contribute to connectivity
milestone	longest MS chain	Invalid	$r$	$\% \times r \times \text{level set}$	

}  try best to make your milestone on the longest chain

# Model Analysis

.  $H(\text{miner's state, Tx}) < c \times \text{miner's hashing power}$

$\mathbb{P}(\text{Tx is not workable for any miner}) \approx e^{-c}$

# Model Analysis

Waste


$$\theta(c) = \frac{(1 - e^{-\mu\bar{t}})\mu c\bar{t}}{1 + (1 - e^{-\mu\bar{t}})\mu c\bar{t}}$$

Queueing latency

$$\frac{1}{c} \frac{1}{\rho\mu} \ln \left( \frac{1}{1 - \frac{\rho}{1-\theta(c)}} \right)$$

Infection delay

$$\frac{2 + 2\ln(n)}{\mu} + \frac{1}{nr\mu}$$





# Performance

## System parameters

Partition factor $c$	Block generation speed	MS interval	Avg. # of blocks per level set
0.01	1200 blocks/second	10 seconds	12000

# Performance

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Partition factor $c$	Block generation speed	MS interval	Avg. # of blocks per level set
0.01	1200 blocks/second	10 seconds	12000

## Modeling assumptions

Tx arrival rate	Percentage of malicious hashing power
1000	30%

# Performance

## System parameters

Partition factor $c$	Block generation speed	MS interval	Avg. # of blocks per level set
0.01	1200 blocks/second	10 seconds	12000

## Modeling assumptions

Tx arrival rate	Percentage of malicious hashing power
1000	30%

## Performance

Queueing latency	Infection delay	Security latency	Wasted capacity
188 seconds	23 seconds	810 seconds	1.7%

# Summary

consensus

reward

algorithm

- ☑ TPS
- ☑ Latency: waiting + confirmation
- ☑ Concentration of mining power
- ☑ Transactions with little fees

# Summary

consensus

reward

algorithm

economic model

- TPS
- Latency: waiting + confirmation
- Concentration of mining power
- Transactions with little fees

- How to issue new coins: inflation, limited supply, ...?
- How to incentivize people to provide storage and bandwidth service?

# Summary

consensus

reward

algorithm

economic model

optimization

- TPS
- Latency: waiting + confirmation
- Concentration of mining power
- Transactions with little fees

- How to issue new coins: inflation, limited supply, ...?
- How to incentivize people to provide storage and bandwidth service?
- How to adaptively adjust the number of blocks created per unit of time?

# Consensus Mechanism Design based on Structured Directed Acyclic Graphs

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<sup>\*†</sup>DMAC Lab

<sup>\*†</sup>Department of Industrial Engineering and Decision Analytics

<sup>†</sup>Department of Mathematics

<sup>\*†</sup>The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

January 9, 2019

## Abstract

We introduce a structure for the directed acyclic graph (DAG) and a mechanism design based on that structure so that peers can reach consensus at large scale based on proof of work (PoW). We also design a mempool transaction assignment method based on the DAG structure to render negligible the probability that a transaction being processed by more than one miners. The result is a significant scale-up of the capacity without sacrificing security and decentralization.

*Key words: consensus; directed acyclic graph; proof of work; transaction assignment.*

arXiv.org

arXiv:[1901.02755](https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.02755)

GitHub

coming soon